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artiicial intelligence (AI) is rapidly moving to change the healthcare sys-tem. Driven by the juxtaposition of 
big data and powerful machine learning 
techniques—terms I will explain momen-
tarily—innovators have begun to develop 
tools to improve the process of clinical 
care, to advance medical research, and 
to improve eiciency. hese tools rely on 
algorithms, programs created from health-
care data that can make predictions or 
recommendations. However, the algo-
rithms themselves are oten too complex 
for their reasoning to be understood or 
even stated explicitly. Such algorithms may 
be best described as “black-box.”1 his 
article briely describes the concept of AI 
in medicine, including several possible 
applications, then considers its legal impli-
cations in four areas of law: regulation, 
tort, intellectual property, and privacy.
AI in Medicine
Medicine, like many other ields, is expe-
riencing a conluence of two recent 
developments: the rise of big data, and the 
growth of sophisticated machine learn-
ing/AI techniques that can be used to 
ind complex patterns in those data. Big 
data as a phenomenon is characterized 
by the “three Vs” of volume (large quan-
tities of data), variety (heterogeneity in 
the data), and velocity (fast access to the 
data). In medicine, the data come from 
many sources: electronic health records, 
medical literature, clinical trials, insurance 
claims data, pharmacy records, and even 
information entered by patients into their 
smartphones or recorded on itness track-
ers. Machine learning techniques, a subset 
of AI, use simple learning rules and itera-
tive techniques to ind and use patterns 
in these vast amounts of data. he result-
ing algorithms can make predictions and 
group sets—how long is a patient expected 
to live given his collection of symptoms, 
and does that picture of a patch of skin 
look like a benign or a cancerous lesion?—
but typically, these techniques cannot 
explain why or how they reach the conclu-
sion they do. Either they cannot explain 
it at all, or they can give explanations that 
are accurate but meaningless in terms of 
medical understanding.2 Because of this 
inherent opacity (which might or might 
not be augmented with deliberate secrecy 
about how the algorithms were devel-
oped and validated), I describe this ield 
as to “black-box medicine,” though it has 
also been referred to as AI in medicine or 
“predictive analytics.”3 To add to the com-
plexity, when more data are available for 
the machine learning algorithms, those 
data can be incorporated to reine future 
predictions, as well as to change the algo-
rithms themselves. he algorithms at the 
heart of black-box medicine, then, are not 
only opaque but also likely to change over 
time.
Black-box medicine has tremendous 
potential for use throughout the health-
care system, including in prognostics, 
diagnostics, image analysis, resource allo-
cation, and treatment recommendations. 
Machine learning is most familiar in the 
context of image recognition, and an algo-
rithm has already been developed that can 
identify skin cancer by analyzing images 
of skin lesions; the algorithm performs as 
well as board-certiied dermatologists.4 A 
recent New England Journal of Medicine 
article suggests that such algorithms could 
soon enter widespread use in image analy-
sis, aiding or displacing much of the work 
of anatomical pathologists or radiologists 
within the span of years.5 Another cur-
rent algorithm can predict which trauma 
victims are likely to hemorrhage by con-
stantly analyzing vital signs and can in 
turn call for intervention to forestall catas-
trophe; such prognostic algorithms could 
come into use in a similarly short time 
frame.6 A bit farther of, black-box algo-
rithms could be used for diagnosis more 
generally, to recommend of-label uses for 
existing drugs, to allocate scarce resources 
to patients most likely to beneit from 
them, to detect fraud or problematic med-
ical behavior, or to guide research into 
new diseases or conditions. In fact, black-
box algorithms are already in use today 
in smartphone apps that aim to identify 
developmental disorders in infants based 
on facial features7 or autism in young chil-
dren based on eye movement tracking.8 
he potential for beneit from such black-
box medicine is substantial, but it comes 
with its own challenges: scientiic and 
medical, certainly, but also legal. How do 
we ensure that black-box medicine is safe 
and efective, how do we ensure its ei-
cient development and deployment, and 
how do we protect patients and patient 
privacy throughout the process?
Regulation
he irst question to ask is perhaps the 
most fundamental: How do we ensure that 
black-box algorithms are high quality—
that is, that they do what they say, and that 
they do it well and safely? New and emerg-
ing medical technologies and devices are 
typically regulated for safety and eicacy 
by the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA). Whether the FDA actually has 
statutory authority over free-standing 
algorithms used to make medical deci-
sions (or to help make them) depends on 
the relatively complex question of what is 
a “medical device.” he FDA’s regulation 
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of black-box medical algorithms may 
also conlict with its long-standing state-
ment that it does not regulate the practice 
of medicine.9 Elsewhere, I argue that the 
FDA has this authority, probably over 
algorithms standing alone and almost cer-
tainly in the context of linked technology 
that may more readily be called a “medi-
cal device,” but disputes may arise over 
this point.10 Industry dynamics may also 
play a role here: Silicon Valley, the hub of 
much of the innovation in AI generally, 
traditionally has not worked closely with 
regulators like the FDA.
Assuming that the FDA can and will 
regulate AI in the healthcare system 
(and the agency has asserted this abil-
ity and intent),11 typically two tools help 
ensure safety and eicacy of new medi-
cal technology: scientiic understanding 
and clinical trials. Unfortunately, these 
two tools do not work well in the context 
of black-box medicine. Understanding 
does not work for obvious reasons—
we do not understand how a black-box 
algorithm makes decisions, because the 
machine learning techniques generally 
cannot tell us their reasoning, and even 
when they can, the results are oten too 
complex to understand. Using clinical 
trials for testing safety, eicacy, and valid-
ity might work for some algorithms, but 
will not work for many others. For algo-
rithms that divide patients into groups 
and suggest a particular treatment, clin-
ical trials could be used to test their 
eicacy. But some algorithms will make 
highly personalized treatment predic-
tions or recommendations, so that the 
use of clinical trials would be infeasible. 
And even for algorithms that are ame-
nable to trials, the beneits of black-box 
medicine—quick, cheap shortcuts to 
otherwise inaccessible medical knowl-
edge—would be seriously delayed or 
even curtailed due to the slow, ponder-
ous, expensive enterprise of clinical trials. 
For algorithms that change as they incor-
porate more data, the challenges are even 
more pronounced. In short, in black-box 
medicine, traditional methods of testing 
new medical technologies and devices are 
likely not to work at all in some instances, 
and to slow or stile innovation in others.
So how should the FDA tackle this 
challenge? he most fruitful path, I 
argue, will likely be more lexible than 
rigid, involving somewhat lighter pre-
market scrutiny (focused on procedural 
safeguards like the quality of the data 
used, the development techniques, and 
the validation procedures) coupled with 
robust post-market oversight as these 
algorithms enter into clinical care. he 
FDA has recently expressed interest in 
this approach.12 Of course, this is eas-
ier said than done; the parallel case of 
post-market surveillance for drugs is 
notoriously troublesome to implement. 
One attractive possibility would be for 
the FDA to enable oversight help from 
other sophisticated healthcare entities by 
collaborating with them and, crucially, 
enabling ways to get them important 
and useful information. Hospitals, insur-
ance companies, and physician specialty 
associations all have an interest in ensur-
ing that black-box algorithms actually 
work to help patients (and, potentially, 
their bottom lines). Rival developers may 
also have an interest, especially in ind-
ing problems with existing algorithms. 
In addition, these sophisticated entities 
may have the capacity to perform eval-
uations, especially as they are used in 
clinical practice, and to generate perfor-
mance data. Nevertheless, performing 
this type of collaborative governance role 
requires information, and many algo-
rithm developers are reluctant to share 
that kind of information with any other 
entities. Potentially the FDA could serve 
as a centralized information-sharing role 
to allow those other entities to play their 
part in regulating black-box medicine. 
However, exactly how this idea might 
become a reality is very much an unre-
solved question.
Tort
What do we do when black-box medi-
cine goes awry? he law of tort interacts 
with black-box medicine in a few diferent 
contexts. First, if there are laws built into 
the algorithms themselves, or if regulation 
fails to ensure that algorithms are high 
quality, then the developers of algorithms 
(or technologies that rely on them) 
might become liable under tort law. 
However, courts have been reluctant 
to extend or apply product liabil-
ity theories to sotware developers, 
and even more reluctant in the 
context of healthcare sotware.13 
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Part of that reluctance has come from the 
fact that healthcare sotware to date has 
been characterized primarily as technol-
ogy that helps healthcare providers make 
decisions by providing them with infor-
mation or analysis, with the inal decision 
always resting in the hands of the provider. 
Black-box medicine turns that notion on 
its head, or at least it can. Can and should 
healthcare providers be fully responsi-
ble for decisions suggested or made by 
black-box algorithms that they do not, or 
cannot, understand?
his raises a second set of questions. 
What must healthcare providers and 
healthcare institutions—doctors, nurses, 
hospitals, managed-care organizations, 
and the like—do to fulill their duties 
of care to patients in a healthcare world 
with black-box algorithms? Must pro-
viders themselves evaluate the quality of 
black-box algorithms, based on proce-
dural measures (validation undertaken, 
performance statistics, etc.) before rely-
ing on those algorithms in the course of 
providing care? And should healthcare 
institutions perform similar evaluations 
before implementing black-box sotware? 
I argue elsewhere that they should, but 
currently the information necessary for 
that type of evaluation is largely unavail-
able—just as in the parallel regulatory 
context mentioned above.14 Similarly, if an 
algorithm suggests an intervention that 
seems mundane but unhelpful, useless 
and expensive, or dangerous, should the 
provider second-guess the recommenda-
tion? On the one hand, the answer seems 
an obvious “yes”—providers are trained to 
care for patients—but on the other hand, 
if providers only implement those deci-
sions they would have reached on their 
own, they will leave on the table much of 
the beneit that black-box medicine prom-
ises to extract from otherwise inaccessible 
patterns in big data. his would not leave 
everything on the table—algorithms can 
still potentially perform the usual analyses 
more quickly and cheaply15—but excessive 
caution is not costless. Courts have not 
tackled these issues yet, but they will need 
to in the near future.
Intellectual Property
Intellectual property protection creates 
another set of challenges for the devel-
opment of black-box medicine.16 When 
irms invest in developing black-box 
algorithms, how can they protect that 
investment? Developing black-box algo-
rithms can involve considerable expense. 
Developers must generate, assemble, or 
acquire the tremendous data sets needed 
to train their algorithms; they must assem-
ble the expertise and resources to actually 
develop those algorithms; and they must 
validate them to make sure they work. 
Normally, we might expect intellectual 
property to provide some measure of pro-
tection for the information goods created 
by such expenditures, so that irms are 
willing to invest the necessary funds for 
their development without fear that result-
ing inventions will be appropriated by 
others.17 However, intellectual property its 
relatively poorly for black-box medicine.
Patents are a natural choice to pro-
tect technological innovation, but patents 
do not provide strong incentives for 
black-box medicine. A string of recent 
decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court 
interpreting section 101 of the Patent Act, 
which governs patentable subject matter, 
has made it very di cult to patent black-
box algorithms.18 In Mayo Collaborative 
Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 
the Supreme Court repeated its long-
standing statement that laws of nature 
cannot be patented.19 However, the Court 
applied that rule to a diagnostic test that 
used the measurement of a metabolite 
level in a patient’s blood to adjust the dos-
age of a drug, which many, including the 
Federal Circuit below, had thought to be 
a patentable application of such a law. he 
Supreme Court used very broad language 
to invalidate the patent: “[W]ell-under-
stood, routine, conventional activity 
previously engaged in by scientists who 
work in the ield . . . is normally not sui-
cient to transform an unpatentable law of 
nature into a patent-eligible application 
of such a law.”20 Where underlying infor-
mation about the biological world is the 
heart of the invention, merely using that 
information to guide medical treatment 
is unpatentable (as is the information 
itself). But this describes most black-box 
algorithms quite well and suggests that 
those algorithms are unlikely to be pat-
entable subject matter. Further patent 
problems might arise under section 112, 
which requires a “written description” 
of the invention. Although this issue has 
not been tested in the courts, it is at least 
debatable how well one can describe an 
algorithm that is opaque, and how broad 
the resulting protection would be.21
Trade secrecy—or secrecy in general—
seems an obvious solution but comes with 
its own problems. Trade secret law pro-
tects from appropriation information 
that is kept secret and gets commercial 
value from its secrecy. What better way 
than secrecy to protect an algorithm that 
is already opaque and cannot be under-
stood? he data on which an algorithm 
is generated, the method by which the 
algorithm was developed, and the pro-
cess of its validation can all be kept secret 
by irms looking to protect their invest-
ment in the algorithm’s development. And 
indeed, irms that are developing black-
box algorithms seem to be relying on just 
such secrecy. But while secrecy may be 
an efective intellectual property strategy, 
it runs headlong into the concerns raised 
above about safety, malpractice, and regu-
lation. How willing will doctors, patients, 
and insurers be to accept medical algo-
rithms where not only is the working of 
the algorithm a mystery, but also the way 
the algorithm was made and tested, along 
with the data underlying its develop-
ment? And if third parties are indeed to 
be actively involved in ensuring algorith-
mic quality and validity, as I suggest above, 
how can they conduct such evaluations 
without the underlying information? he 
reliance of algorithm developers on trade 
secrecy echoes other past situations where 
information relevant to public health has 
been kept secret, and these experiences 
suggest that there may be similar ights 
over access to algorithmic information.22
However, if intellectual property 
incentives are unavailable to help pro-
tect investments in black-box medicine, 
will irms invest suiciently? How can the 
government help drive this form of inno-
vation while ensuring that it is safe and 
efective? hese questions are and will 
remain pressing for the development of AI 
in health care.
Privacy
Finally, privacy concerns run through the 
development and deployment of black-
box medicine.23 Privacy is important in 
at least two areas: gathering immense 
amounts of healthcare data to develop 
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algorithms, and sharing such data to over-
see them. Algorithm developers need to 
assemble data from multiple sources to 
train machine learning algorithms. hose 
data—as well as data about how the algo-
rithms perform in practice—may then be 
shared with other entities in the health-
care system for the purpose of evaluation 
and validation, as described above. In 
each case, patient-oriented data privacy 
is a concern, most notably as mandated 
under the Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act’s (HIPAA’s) Pri-
vacy Rule. he Privacy Rule governs and 
restricts both disclosure and use of “pro-
tected health information” (that is, most 
individually identiiable health infor-
mation) by “covered entities” (mostly, 
healthcare providers, health insurers, 
health information clearinghouses, and 
business associates of the same).24 HIPAA 
creates a relatively complex set of permit-
ted and restricted uses of protected health 
information. Notably, de-identiied infor-
mation is not governed by the Privacy 
Rule (though it raises its own concerns 
about data aggregation and the possibility 
of re-identiication), and neither is infor-
mation collected by noncovered entities 
like Google, Apple, or other aggregators 
of big data.25 Navigating the HIPAA Pri-
vacy Rule—and otherwise managing and 
addressing the privacy concerns of those 
whose data is used throughout black-box 
medicine—creates yet another ongoing set 
of potential legal concerns.
Conclusion
Black-box medicine has tremendous 
potential to reshape health care, and it is 
moving rapidly to do so. Some health-
care black-box algorithms are already at 
work in consumer-directed smartphone 
apps, and others are likely to enter medical 
practice in the span of years. But the legal 
issues involved with the development and 
implementation of AI algorithms, which 
we do not and cannot understand, are 
substantial. As described here, regulation, 
legal causes of action such as medical mal-
practice and product liability, intellectual 
property, and patient privacy all have real 
implications for the way black-box medi-
cine is developed and deployed. In turn, 
black-box medicine may change the way 
we approach some of these issues in the 
context of contemporary health care. Does 
entity-centered privacy regulation make 
sense in a world where giant data agglom-
erations are necessary and useful? Should 
intellectual property law ind new ways 
to recognize the primacy of health data 
and the fast-moving nature of algorithms? 
Must the legal doctrine of the “learned 
intermediary” bow to the recognition that 
doctors cannot fully understand all the 
technologies they use or the choices such 
technologies help them make when they 
are not provided the needed and/or neces-
sary information? Should the FDA change 
how it regulates new medical technol-
ogy as AI sotware gains prominence? As 
black-box medicine develops and evolves, 
the need to consider these legal issues—
and the need for scientiically literate 
lawyers who can understand them in con-
text—will continue to grow. u
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